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 Bordering Tito 
The Romanian Borders under the Pressure 
of the Soviet-Yugoslav Conflict 
 
 
DAN DRĂGHIA 
 
 
 
Even though it was supposed to be a united and coherent front for many 
years, the newly established communist bloc in Central and Eastern Europe 
experienced the first signs of internal disagreement as early as the spring of 
19481. The growing personal and ideological dissensions between the two most 
prominent communist leaders, Iosip Broz Tito and Joseph Stalin2, brought 
important political changes to the entire bloc of “people’s democracies”. The 
conflict put the communist regime from Romania in an apparently difficult 
                                                 
1
 See Leonid Gibianskii, “The Beginning of the Soviet-Yugoslav Conflict and the Cominform”, in 
Salvatore Veca (ed.), The Cominform: Minutes of the Three Conferences 1947/1948/1949, 
Fondazione Giangiacomo Feltrinelli, Milano, 1994, pp. 465-482/p. 465. 
2
 As our focus in this article will be on the impact that this conflict had on the Romanian border 
control institutions, and especially on those segments charged with the Yugoslav border, as 
well as on the general political atmosphere in Romania toward this country, the events and the 
story behind the Stalin-Tito split will be left aside. Nevertheless, being the source of all these 
changes and a major pointer for the volatile character of the border atmosphere within a 
totalitarian regime, most of the times affected by a dictator’s views, we have to indicate some 
references on this topic. As a major subject for cold war studies, the split between Tito and 
Stalin has been tackled by almost every general study on the relations between the capitalist 
and communist blocs, most notably by those studies, which dealt with the first decade of 
communist rule in Eastern Europe. There is also a significant amount of literature exclusively 
dedicated to this topic, which is implicitly more qualified to express the real levers behind this 
conflict and behind all its consequences, out of which we are interested in the Romanian ones. 
For an inside view see Milovan Djilas, Tito: the Story from Inside, Harcourt, New York, 
1980,translated by Vasilije Kojić and Richard Hayes. A good perspective, though a more 
general one is that of Ivo Banac in the first chapter, entitled“Sources”, of his book With Stalin 
against Tito. Cominformist Splits in Yugoslav Communism, Cornell University Press, Ithaca 
1988, pp. 3-44. We also have to mention here two articles that focus on the causes of the split: 
Geoffrey Swain, “The Cominform: Tito’s International?”, The Historical Journal, vol. 35, no. 
2, September 1992, pp. 641-663 and Jeronim Perović, “The Tito-Stalin Split: A Reassessment 
in Light of New Evidence”, Journal of Cold War Studies, vol. 9, no. 2, Spring 2007, pp. 32-63. 
All of these analyses emphasize Tito’s desire to play a more important role within the 
communist bloc, which made him take bold initiatives without Moscow’s approval that not 
only upset Stalin as an overall leader, but also represented a threat for the strategic directions 
the Soviets had in relation to the West. See Geoffrey Swain, “The Cominform…cit.”, p. 641. 
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position. As the other communist regimes in the area, the Romanian one was 
now forced to relate to Yugoslavia as if to an enemy, in spite of the good 
relations that the two countries had enjoyed until then.  
That was historically a good relationship, going a long way back, and not 
only since the communists had come to power3. However, at that time, in 1948, 
the communist regime was young, strictly dependent on Moscow, and 
aggressively seeking internal consolidation. Relying on the communist habit of 
meeting out punishment to traitors, as well as on the fact that Stalin wanted to 
provide Tito with a lesson, the assessment of the Romanian communist regime 
laid out above represents one of the arguments explored in this article, 
especially in its first part, which is centred on the policy changes in relation to 
Yugoslavia. It means that, especially with regard to the border control regime, 
the period analysed here was further influenced by the peculiar pressure Russia 
put on Romania, which was a former “close friend” of Yugoslavia's. Also, it 
was influenced by the desire of the Romanian communists to closely follow 
Moscow’s indications, all of these being sine qua non conditions for the 
regime's consolidation, an evolution of events they were seeking anyway. 
As if the general conditions set for Romanians under communist rule to 
travel outside their country weren’t already harsh, the border regime created 
through the set of measures adopted after the Tito-Stalin split was one of the 
most emphatic examples of the “Westphalian model of border management”, 
though not quite on the same principles that the latter was built on. As defined 
in a recent work by Ruben Zaiotti4, by this latter term, which today is related to 
the common interpretation of border as a “marked and sometimes fortified line 
in the landscape”, we understand a historical trajectory of managing territorial 
sovereignty5 by various political units6. The most important feature of this 
culture, apart from its nationalistic approach to the management of borders, is 
that the states must possess stable, clearly identifiable and controllable borders. 
This culture is opposed to that of the fluid medieval borders or the 
contemporary cultures of border control imagined at a regional level and named 
                                                 
3
 Leaving aside historical facts, among them the absence of any armed conflict, which 
might be the most obvious one, we can quote here a geopolitical proverb that circulates among 
Romanians and says that “Romania has only two good neighbours: Serbia/Yugoslavia and 
the Black Sea”. 
4
 Ruben Zaiotti, Cultures of Border Control. Schengen, and the Evolution of European 
Frontiers, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2011, p. 14. 
5
 Maybe the most well known definition of territoriality, which we consider valid here, 
comes from the classical work of Robert David Sack, Human Territoriality: Its Theory 
and History, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, New York & Melbourne, 1986, p. 19, 
who sees it as “an attempt by an individual or group to affect, influence, or control people, 
phenomena, and relationships, by delimiting and asserting control aver a geographic area”. 
6
 For the larger framework of the “Westphalian culture of border control” see Ruben 
Zaiotti, Cultures of Border Control…cit., pp. 45-47.  
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by Zaiotti Schengen and Brussels7. Westphalia, the name of this nationalistic 
culture of border management, comes from the place where the treaty with the 
same name was signed in 1648, which is commonly held to mark the demise of 
the medieval political space. Zaiotti traces to it the roots of this border control 
culture. That is why this culture is intimately related to the modern state system, 
being spread around the world overwhelmingly, especially since late 19th century, 
reaching its peak after World War II, and not surprisingly in the Cold War era. 
 
 
The Paradox of Communist View on Borders 
 
We went through these general assertions on border control cultures 
because we consider them important for the right placement of our subject 
within a historical and theoretical background. The same author mentioned 
above, however, starts from the idea that the spread of communism in Europe 
was a challenge to the Westphalian model, mainly because of its communist 
anti-nationalistic approach to borders, and concludes that, in its functional 
characteristics, this post-war evolution actually reinforced the model that it was 
challenging8. This was the case especially with the Iron Curtain (a string of 
several borders), which therefore, from this functional perspective, became an 
extreme example of Westphalian model, even though it wasn’t an ethnic-
national border at all9. Starting in 1948, this was also the case with the 
Romanian-Yugoslav border, which became a special part of the Iron Curtain 
because it was also subject to the rivalries occurring within the communist bloc.  
To complete our general assessment of the atmosphere in which the 
Soviet pressure on Romania occurred, we have to also say that, by its nature, 
the communist regime, through its ideology and practice, was leaning 
toward an autarchic and isolated society, which included as an almost 
compulsory condition the closing of borders and a strict control of every 
border related activity. In fact, this ideological inclination toward 
isolationism and its immediate cause, the constant suspicion toward any 
external or supposedly externally linked activity formed the basis of 
communist border management and its development10. That is why, in 
                                                 
7
 Ibidem, pp. 91, 117. 
8
 Ibidem, pp. 55-57. 
9
 See the German case of separation. 
10
 On the ideological roots of the communist system of border control management see the 
first two chapters (“1. The Paradox of Socialist Isolation: Ideology and Territory in the 
Construction of Soviet Border Controls”, and “2. States, Regimes, and Border Controls: 
The Link between Communism and Isolation”) of Andrea Chandler’s book, Institutions of 
Isolation: Border Controls in the Soviet Union and its Successor States, 1917-1993, 
McGill-Queen’s University Press, Montreal, 1998, pp. 3-29. 
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Romania's case11, which was different from that of the other communist 
countries neighbouring Yugoslavia only in its details, the regime's pressure on 
society as a consequence of Tito’s “betrayal” of the Soviet bloc was motivated 
significantly by the need for internal repression12. A significant part of this 
repression resulted from military preparations, which were mostly defensive, 
and deeply affected people's lives. Under these circumstances, Romanian 
communists, acting under Moscow’s direct supervision, planned to prevent 
potential weaknesses if faced with a very seriously supposed invasion by 
Western “imperialists” through Yugoslavia13.  
To quote an internal report of the Romanian border guard, “the border 
with Yugoslavia is not only the line of demarcation between two states it also 
represents the boundary between two political beliefs and social 
arrangements”14. This being said, the objective of the regime was extreme. As 
stated by a former border guard superior officer, the expected result, which 
came as a response to pressure from Moscow generated by the Stalin-Tito split, 
was the complete shut down of the Romanian border with Yugoslavia15. 
Starting from the radical change in political orientation and discourse toward 
Tito, and from its implementation within border control institutions, in the 
following pages we will attempt to evaluate not only the organizational 
outcomes and their consequences in the field within these institutional bodies, 
but also the repressive results of this political turn of events.  
                                                 
11
 For an extended discussion on the so called “besieged city” mentality of communism in 
power, applied to the Romanian case, see Dan Drăghia, “Apărarea regimului sau apărarea 
frontierelor? Trupele de grăniceri (1944-1960)”, in Structuri de partid şi de stat în timpul 
regimului comunist, Anuarul Institutului de Investigare a Crimelor Comunismului în 
România, vol. III, Editura Polirom, Bucureşti, 2008, pp. 158-160.  
12
 Victor Frunză, Istoria comunismului în România, Editura Victor Frunză, București, 
1999, p. 341. 
13
 An interesting discussion on the Soviet intentions toward Yugoslavia, applied to the Hungarian 
case, which we think is also true in the Romanian case, can be found in László Ritter, War on 
Tito’s Yugoslavia? The Hungarian Army in Early Cold War Soviet Strategy, pp. 1-33, part of the 
Parallel History Project on NATO and the Warsaw Pact (PHP), www.php.isn.ethz.ch, by 
permission of the Center for Security Studies at ETH Zurich and the National Security 
Archive at the George Washington University on behalf of the PHP network, last accessed at 
http://php.isn.ethz.ch/collections/coll_tito/documents/introduction_ritter.pdf, on 3th June 2014. 
The author stresses the fact that the Hungarian army “was not preparing for an invasion of 
Yugoslavia”, but only “to repel an enemy attack on Hungary first by defensive and then 
by counter-attack operations in case of a potential world war” (Ibidem, p. 3). This 
assessment, which we consider valid overall, goes very well with the general USSR 
policy of defensive consolidation and of avoiding direct conflict, which was preferred in 
the first years after the war within the communist bloc.  
14
 Arhiva Consiliului Naţional pentru Studierea Arhivelor Securităţii (ACNSAS), Fond 
Documentar, Dosar (D) 13.117/3, fila (f) 57. 
15
 Sever Neagoe, Personalităţi din evoluţia grănicerilor în secolul XX, Bucureşti, 2001, p. 155. 
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Tito – from Hero to Spy 
 
As was the case with the other East-European countries, Romania’s 
change of attitude toward Tito was sudden and radical. In December 194716, 
Tito was welcomed to Bucharest by Romanian communist leaders with 
massive honours, being considered one of the greatest friends of Romania. 
Thousands of people gathered to hail him as such. The newspapers described 
his visit minutely, in eulogistic terms17, calling him “the legendary hero”18, 
and a special brochure detailing the events of his visit in Bucharest was 
published19. The climax was the signing of a mutual treaty of friendship 
between the two countries. 
Though some sources20 indicate reticence on the part of Romanian 
communists, led by their newly minted leader Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej21, only 
a half year later Romania wholeheartedly joined the June 28 Cominform22 
resolution against Yugoslavia23. This resolution condemned Tito as anti-Marxist, 
                                                 
16
 Tito didn’t officially inform Stalin in advance about his visit to Romania, a situation in 
which the communists from Bucharest could be considered accomplices. See Geoffrey 
Swain, Tito. A Biography, I.B. Tauris, London &New York, 2011, p. 92.  
17
 See the official newspaper of the Romanian Communist Party (RCP), Scânteia, 
III/XVI/1003-1004, Friday 19th and Saturday 20th December 1947. 
18
 Ibidem, III/XVI/898, Monday, 1 December 1947, cover page. Not much later, when the 
split between Tito and Stalin occasioned mutual attacks within the Romanian communist 
leadership, all these exaggerations made to please the “Yugoslav special guest” were used 
in the internal fight for power and became vulnerable spots mostly for those in charge of 
the propaganda apparatus at the time of the visit. See Ioan Scurtu, “PMR şi criza 
iugoslavă”,Dosarele istoriei, vol. III, no. 3(19), 1998, p. 37.  
19
  See Mareşalul Tito în România, Bucureşti, 1948. Earlier that year a Yugoslav propaganda 
brochure, written by B. Polevoi, was also translated and published: Mareşalul Iosip Broz 
Tito: mare luptător pentru pace şi democraţie, Bucureşti, 1947.  
20
 See Leonid Gibianskii, “The Beginning of the Soviet-Yugoslav Conflict…cit.”, pp. 479-481. 
See also Paul Niculescu-Mizil, O istorie trăită, Editura Enciclopedică, Bucureşti, 1997, pp. 22-23. 
21
 Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej (1901-1965) – former railroad technician, the communist leader 
of Romania from 1948 until his death in 1965. More on his regime in Dennis Deletant, 
Communist Terror in Romania.Gheorghiu-Dej and the Police State 1948-1965, C Hurst 
& Co Publishers Ltd,London, 1999. 
22
 Cominform was The Information Bureau of the Communist and Workers’ Parties, 
established in September 1947 to replace the old Comintern, which was dissolved in 
1943. It was essentially the international organization through which the Communist Party 
of the Soviet Union controlled the other communist parties in the world. 
23
 On the resolution preparations see Silvio Pons, “The Twilight of the Cominform”, in 
Salvatore Veca (ed.), The Cominform...cit., pp. 483-504. For a discussion about 
Gheorghiu Dej’s attitude in this critical period from the beginning of the conflict see 
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basically using the classical communist sentence of not following Moscow’s 
line. The official text also included references to Tito's nationalistic 
orientation, categorizing Yugoslavia as a potential “colony” of the West24, 
which automatically meant an “imperialistic danger” came from its direction. 
It is by no means insignificant that this meeting to condemn Yugoslavia was 
held in Bucharest. The Romanian capital was also soon to be hosting the 
Cominform propaganda headquarters, most notably its official newspaper, For 
Lasting Peace, for People’s Democracy!, which had previously been located 
in Belgrade25. 
Almost immediately after the Cominform meeting, on July 2nd, the 
Romanian communist political bureau unsurprisingly decided to release an 
internal document requesting all the party departments to treat the Cominform 
resolution against Tito as the new official attitude toward Yugoslavia26. From 
then on, all references to the Yugoslav communist leadership, were made by 
using the standardized phrase “the Tito-Rankovici27 gang of traitors and spies”, 
and a fierce internal propaganda was disseminated portraying the Yugoslav 
leader in this way28. In 1949, the above-mentioned treaty of friendship was 
unilaterally broken by Romania. However, the most obvious and best known 
expression of Romania’s role within the Soviet led communist bloc campaign 
against Tito29 was the fact that Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej was designated to read 
                                                                                                                       
Kenneth Jowitt, Revolutionary Breakthroughs and National Development. The Case of 
Romania, 1944-1965, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1971, pp. 127-130. 
24
 Clica fascistă a lui Tito, duşman de moarte al păcii, democraţiei şi socialismului, Editura 
pentru Literatură Politică, Bucureşti, 1953, p. 5. 
25
 Florin Constantiniu, Schisma roşie. România şi declanşarea conflictului sovieto-iugoslav, 
1948-1950, Editura Compania, Bucureşti, 2007, pp. 37-39. 
26
 Ibidem, pp. 99-103. 
27
 Alexander Rankovici (1909-1983) – influential Yugoslav communist leader of Serbian 
origins, Minister of the Interior and the chief of Tito’s secret police until his purge, in 
1966. See http://www.osaarchivum.org/files/holdings/300/8/3/text/86-3-147.shtml, last 
accessed on June 25th 2014.  
28
 See Victor Frunză, Istoria comunismului…cit., p. 396 and Paul Sfetcu, 13 ani în 
anticamera lui Dej, Editura Fundaţiei Culturale Române, Bucureşti, 2000, p. 133. For 
exemplification, see also I. Lautu, Abandonarea teoriei marxist-leniniste asupra claselor 
şi a luptei de clasă de către conducerea Partidului Comunist din Iugoslavia, Editura 
Partidului Muncitoresc Român (PMR), Bucureşti, 1948; Horia Liman, Tito. Mareşalul 
ienicerilor, Editura de Stat, Bucureşti, 1950, which has an eloquent series of anti-Tito 
cartoons; Aurel Duma, Clica lui Tito, unealtă sângeroasă a imperialiştilor americani şi 
englezi,Editura PMR, Bucureşti, 1951, which tries to link Yugoslavia with the “western 
imperialists”; Poporul iugoslav luptă împotriva regimului fascist al lui Tito, Editura 
Direcţiei Generale Politice MAI, Bucureşti, 1952; and Clica fascistă a lui 
Tito…cit.,which is a collection of anti-Tito speeches by some Romanian and international 
communist leaders. 
29
 For the Stalinist anti-Tito campaigns, see Adam Ulam, Titoism and the Cominform, 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952and Lilly Marcou, Le Kominform: le 
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the report against Yugoslavia (entitled “The Yugoslav Communist Party in the 
hands of assassins and spies”)30 at the last Cominform meeting, which was held 
in November 1949 in Budapest. 
Nevertheless, these public manifestations, which made Romania one of 
the most vocal mouthpieces for Tito’s expulsion from the “communist 
family”31, were only the surface manifestations of the pressure applied by 
Moscow to act against Yugoslavia. In the context of this completely new 
political environment, what was maybe more significant were the unseen 
implications of it. Most importantly, the Soviet presence in Romania, which 
was already significant, grew in intensity and was oriented toward palpable anti-
Yugoslav measures. The Soviets became more involved in the communist 
administration, more so as the negative Yugoslav experience was still fresh in 
their minds. Thus, it was no surprise that a person like Mark Borisovici 
Mitin32, who was one of Stalin’s leading doctrinaires and the editor in chief 
of the Cominform newspaper in Bucharest, became Moscow’s most influential 
advisor in Romania, especially in relation to Gheorghiu-Dej, the leader 
whom he supported33. 
Because of the Romanian domestic context, with the communists 
completely dependent on Moscow’s presence and engaged in a still undecided 
fight for power within their own ranks34, Stalin’s directives were not only 
followed without fail, but rapidly became a source of internal competition 
between the communist leaders in terms of how closely they were followed. 
At the Politburo meeting of July 2nd, some voices already started accusing 
Dej of being a “personal friend” of Tito35. At a time when Stalin removed 
                                                                                                                       
comunisme de guerre froide, Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 
Paris, 1977. 
30
 The entire text of the report, which opens the volume, can be found in Clica fascistă a lui 
Tito…cit., pp. 5-28. In his memoires, Gheorghiu-Dej’s former chief of staff pleads that 
the Romanian leader was forced by Stalin to read the report, the main ideas within it being 
personally transmited to him by the Soviet dictator. See Paul Sfetcu, 13 ani în anticamera 
lui Dej, cit., p. 308. Signed by the same Gheorghiu-Dej, we can also cite here an article 
published in number 9/36, 1 May 1949 [International Labour Day, especially marked 
within the article] of the Cominformnewspaper For Lasting Peace, for People’s 
Democracy!,entitled “The Gang of Tito – Deadly Enemy of the Socialism”. See Gheorghe 
Gheorghiu-Dej, Articole şi cuvântări, Editura PMR, București, 1951, pp. 287-293. 
31
 Florin Constantiniu, Schisma roşie…cit., pp. 51-52. 
32
 Mark Borisovici Mitin (1901-1987) – philosopher, former director of the Marx-Engels-
Lenin-Stalin Institute. During his service in Bucharest he was also a member of the 
Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). See Who’s Who 
in the USSR 1965-66, Scarecrow Press, New York, 1966, p. 560. 
33
 Vladimir Tismăneanu, Stalinism for All Seasons: A Political History of Romanian 
Communism, University of California Press, Berkley, 2003, p. 122. 
34
 Idem, Irepetabilul trecut, 2nd ed., Editura Curtea Veche,Bucureşti, 2008, pp. 194-199. 
35
 See Paul Sfetcu, 13 ani în anticamera lui Dej, cit., pp. 308-309; Ioan Scurtu, “PMR…cit.”, p. 35. 
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from power many communist leaders in Eastern Europe, some of them 
under Tito related accusations36, it is no doubt that this situation contributed to 
Dej’s determination to do anything that was needed to stay in power37. Also, he 
was under great pressure to display an aggressive attitude toward Tito’s 
Yugoslavia at that moment, just like all the other Romanian communist leaders, 
regardless of their internal positioning. Thus, it was no coincidence that 
collaboration with Tito was one of the most common accusations across the 
spectrum of the political “show trials” in 1950s Romania38. 
At the same time, anti-Tito fever went way beyond the high level political 
struggle, penetrating well within the party membership and across the whole of 
society, not only through the above mentioned massive propaganda campaign, 
but also as a result of the daily atmosphere and the activity of the secret police. 
Even though this was not specified in the Romanian Penal Code, the accusation 
of “Titoism” became, by daily practice, a distinct and quite widespread category 
of prison sentences39. Being associated with treason and espionage, it usually 
came with convictions meant to set an example40, like those issued in the 
“Titoist trials” in 1950. 
 
 
An “Anti-Tito Culture of Border Control” 
 
The changes within the border guard system and activitycame as quickly 
as those in Romania's political attitude toward Tito, although it took time for it 
to be extended and eventually implemented.For the Romanian communist 
leaders, the fear of even accidentally failing to do Moscow’s bidding became so 
high that even in small administrative matters they refrained from doing 
anything without Soviet approval. For example, in September 1948, when 
                                                 
36
 For example, in Hungary, Interior Minister Lászlo Rajk (1909-1949), was arrested, 
convicted and executed, the main charges against him being his nationalistic orientation 
and espionage for Tito, which automatically meant treason. The same thing happened to 
Koçi Xoxe (1917-1949), Defense and Interior Minister of Albania, and with Traicio 
Kostov (1897-1949), Deputy Prime Minister of Bulgaria. See Robert Lee Wolff, The 
Balkans in Our Time, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1956. 
37
 Florin Constantiniu, Schisma roşie…cit., pp. 44-47. 
38
 More on this subject in George H. Hodos, Show Trials: Stalinist Purges in Eastern 
Europe, 1948-1954, Praeger Publishing, New York, 1987, pp. 93-110. 
39
 They were sentenced under the Law No. 16/13.01.1949, which provided special 
judgements for “crimes that endanger national security and the growth of the national 
economy”. See Mircea Chiriţoiu, Între David şi Goliath. România şi Iugoslavia în balanţa 
Războiului Rece, Casa Editorială Demiurg, Iaşi, 2005, p. 131. 
40
 There were several cases in which people received even death penalties, for “enemy 
propaganda against the regime” because they made positive comments about Tito’s 
Yugoslavia. See Idem, “România lui Gheorghiu-Dej combate ‘pericolul titoist’”, Dosarele 
istoriei, vol. III, no. 3(19), 1998, pp. 43-44. 
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Yugoslav officials had to come across the border for a simple inauguration of a 
certain jointly built waterworks project, Gheorghiu-Dej himself demanded that 
his subordinates ask for Soviet advice first41. As we will see later on, in this 
highly politicized atmosphere in society brought about by the split between Tito 
and Stalin, the biggest pressure fell on border related institutions and activities. 
The changes within this area, especially regarding the border area with 
Yugoslavia, were so radical that they must be addressed separately in order to 
comprehend their breadth, which wasn’t limited only to border control, but also 
encompassed pre-emptive measures. 
Even though it was an overall change in the political orientation of the 
country, the actual pressure exercised on Romania by the Soviets was mostly 
concentrated on border control institutions, mainly on the Border Guard High 
Command (in Romanian ‒ CTG)42, but also on the intelligence agencies and on 
the army, thus putting extra pressure on Romanian society as a whole.A 
systematic overhaul of border control and border defence followed, targeting 
both the organizational structure and the personnel of the institutions mandated 
with these activities. In the first stage, the communist authorities, drawing 
deeply on the propaganda against Tito, reformed the old organisational structure 
and changed personnel inherited from pre-communist times. In the second stage 
they focused on fortifying the southwest border in the eventuality of a possible 
war against Yugoslavia.  
The reorganization of this entire system followed a pyramid model, with 
its top tier developing a new ideological and conceptual perspective and its 
bottom tiers regulating the activities of small units, as well as the deployment of 
wartime devices (land mines, barbed wire, and trenches) or discretionary 
measures against regular people. In this way, the communist regime turned the 
Romanian-Yugoslav border into a virtual war zone. 
An “anti-Tito culture of border control” formed instantly throughout the 
institutions of the border guard.On the 1st of July 1948, the official newspaper 
of the Romania army, which was compulsory reading in all militarized units, 
opened with the 28th June Cominform resolution against Yugoslavia. Two days 
later, the same newspaper published on its front page an interpretation of the 
resolution signed by Leonte Răutu43, the chief ideologue of the Romanian 
Communist Party (RCP)44. The border guard system being mostly a militarized 
structure, we can say that these two articles represented a sign of the internal 
                                                 
41
 Florin Constantiniu, Schisma roşie…cit., p. 169. 
42
 Comandamentul Trupelor de Grăniceri. 
43
 Leonte Răutu (1910-1993) – former head of the Romania department at Radio Moscow 
during World War II, later head of the propaganda apparatus in communist Romania. For 
a detailed portrait see Cristian Vasile, Vladimir Tismăneanu, Perfectul acrobat. Leonte 
Răutu, măştile răului, Editura Humanitas, Bucureşti, 2008. 
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changes to come. Following the general reorientation of the regime against Tito, 
the first change reshaped the political framework under which the institutions 
commissioned with border control acted.  
The large majority of border related activities were an attribution of the 
CTG, although not exclusively, and this is the institution we will be focusing on 
here. With the official insertion of political officers into the army, roughly a 
year before, this was already a heavily politicised body, so the regime had only 
to disseminate internally its new approach toward Yugoslavia45. The change 
was quick and radical, because political education was already in effect as an 
integral part of the professional training of CTG personnel46. In July 1948, the 
classes for all types of personnel had as their main themes “Tito's treason” and 
the propaganda against him. As with the entire reorganization of the border 
guard system, the task was closely supervised by the Soviets through their 
advisers attached to the CTG. The most important of them was Major General 
Mihail Boico47, who acted staring in February 1948 as a political lieutenant of 
the CTG commander, in charge of Political Direction. In December 1950 he 
was appointed full commander, being replaced in November 1952 with a party 
member, Major General Florian Dănălache48, only recently integrated into the 
army with a military rank, specifically for this job49. 
Under their command, what we called the “anti-Tito culture of border 
control” became a management policy in itself for the CTG, which designed its 
entire activity in line with the “rejection of the Titoistic danger”. Commander 
Boico in particular unleashed a severe internal personnel purge on discretionary 
grounds, going from simple reasons of class origin to almost deadly charges of 
sabotage and espionage for Tito, which was the case with several high ranking 
officers50. As stated in the opening of a statement made by the unit in charge of 
defending the Yugoslav border: 
 
                                                 
45
 Sever Neagoe, Personalităţi din evoluţia grănicerilor…cit., p. 154. 
46
 For exemplification, there is a Work Plan of the Political Directorate of the CTG for the 
last four months of 1949 which describes in detail, on 8 pages, the activities to be carried 
out at each and every level of the institution. See Arhivele Naţionale Istorice 
Centrale (ANIC), Fond Direcţia Generală Politică a Ministerului de Interne 
(DGPMI), D 26, ff. 40-48. 
47
 Mihail Boico (1912-1972) – born Romanian, he joined the RCP in the 1930s; it was said 
about him that he was Moscow’s agent, being also an officer of the Romanian secret 
police, the Securitate. See Doina Jela, Lexiconul negru. Unelte ale represiunii comuniste, 
Editura Curtea Veche, Bucureşti, 2011, p. 51. 
48
 Florian Dănălache (1915-1984) – former propagandist of the RCP, later Ministry of 
Transport. See Florica Dobre (ed.), Membrii C.C. al P.C.R. 1945-1989. Dicţionar, Editura 
Enciclopedică, Bucureşti, 2004, p. 200. 
49
 See Sever Neagoe, Personalităţi din evoluţia grănicerilor…cit.,pp. 151, 162-163, 172. 
50
 See Ibidem, p. 166. See also Mircea Chiriţoiu, Între David şi Goliath…cit., p. 132. 
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“[Yugoslavia] is an aggressive State, ruled by the Tito-Rankovici gang of spies 
and assassins [emphasis added], working for the American-English imperialists. This 
sector of the border is used for inserting spies and diversionists into our country, with the 
purpose of obstructing the peaceful work of our people”51. 
 
On the legislative side, all of the bilateral agreements on border matters 
with Yugoslavia were officially repealed or ignored in practice, as any mutual 
dialogue ceased or was reduced strictly to the unavoidable day to day problems 
of the border area. Of these agreements, the most harmful for the border guard's 
activity was the repeal of the Protocol on the Demarcation of the Common 
Border, dating from 1923, and that regarded small border traffic of people and 
goods52. As such, the CTG was an institution “at war”, even though not 
officially, and no changes were spared in order to help it in its goal of closing 
the border. In the end, however, the military preparations made by the 
communist bloc in view of a possible intervention in Yugoslavia, which we 
think was heavily conditioned by the international situation and designed rather 
defensively, turned out to be used as a tool of domestic repression. 
One of the most important aspects proving this assertion is the tight 
connection established between the CTG and the political police structures, 
mainly the General Directorate of People’s Security (DGSP), the Securitate as it 
is commonly known. By June 1947, the CTG had already been moved from the 
Ministry of Defence to the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Along with this change 
in the chain of command, border guard officers were also stripped of their 
natural attributes of investigating unlawful acts on the border, a task that was 
assigned to the Securitate investigators53. Such peculiar communist tendency of 
relaying on the police for the control of border traffic54 was reinforced by the 
conflict with Tito. This turned the CTG into a simple military institution, on 
guard and ready to respond with violence to any attempts at violating border 
legislation, as it was left without many of its former attributions making it an 
organisation for general border management. For example, the Department for 
the Control of Foreigners and Passports was moved from the CTG to the 
General Police Directorate. The Department of Border Crossing Points had the 
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 ACNSAS, Fond Documentar, D 13.117/3, f. 57. 
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 See ANIC, Fond Consiliul de Stat – Decrete, D 6/1949, ff. 233-235; Ibidem, D 1/1950, ff. 24-7, 30-2. 
53
 Îndreptarul organului de cercetare penală al grănicerilor, Bucureşti, 1969, p. 3. 
54
 In an internal document dated 1956 from the Interior Ministry it was clearly stated 
that “watching and defending the Popular Republic of Romania's state frontier is 
one of the main duties of State Security”. See Arhiva Ministerului Internelor şi 
Reformei Administrative (AMIRA), Fond Direcţia Management şi Resurse Umane 
(DMRU), D 10/1956, f. 3. 
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same fate for a short eight months, until the communist authorities realized that 
the police didn’t have personnel qualified for this activity55.  
When the conflict with Tito broke out, the intelligence activity carried out 
by the Securitate within the CTG was concentrated at the Yugoslav border56, 
along with placing under the same command the troops belonging to both 
institutions. This marriage of convenience of the CTG and the Securitate 
reached its high point in 1952. That is when CTG troops formally merged with 
DGSP troops under the jurisdiction of a special Minister, that of State Security, 
the name of the institution being changed into that of Border Guard and 
Operative Troops Directorate57. 
 
 
More than a Simple Part of the Iron Curtain 
 
This later development was directly related to the structural changes 
brought to the institution by the Stalin-Tito split. With the only concern of the 
regime in the matter of border control and defence being the Yugoslav border, 
the rest of the CTG sub-units deployed on other borders started to be used for 
operations against the partisans in the mountains58, hence the “Operative” 
denomination. This was the climax of a radical structural reorganization 
triggered by the political tensions with Yugoslavia. The core elements of this 
reorganization were applied in 1949. The overall result was that the total 
amount of people at the CTG's disposal increased from around 20.000 people at 
the beginning of 1948 to nearly 50.000 in 1951. Of them, only 22.000 people 
were involved in day to day border defence, the rest being kept on reserve alert 
for possible tensions at the borders, i.e. the Yugoslav one59.  
The structural reorganization had two steps. First, in March 1949, the 
Yugoslav border, which previously was part of a larger border defence sector 
together with most of the Bulgarian border, was assigned solely to the 4th 
Brigade stationed in Timişoara. Then, in October, this brigade was turned into 
the 1st Division, stationed in Lugoj, the only large military unit of the CTG, with 
the other ones being simple brigades. The creation of this division, which had 
two large regiments, later four, best expressed the political tensions with 
Yugoslavia. It was by far the largest unit in size, with all its needs in this regard 
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 Victor Aelenei, Retrospectivă istorică a grănicerilor români şi a Poliţiei de Frontieră 
Române, Editura Pro Transilvania, Bucureşti, 2001, pp. 186-187. 
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 Sever Neagoe, Personalităţi din evoluţia grănicerilor…cit., p. 154. 
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 For more information on the relation between the two bodies see Dan Drăghia, “Apărarea 
regimului sau apărarea frontierelor?...cit.”, pp. 169-174.  
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 Sever Neagoe, Personalităţi din evoluţia grănicerilor…cit., pp. 172-173. 
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 ANIC, DGPMI, Rola (R) Nr. 1326, Cadrele(c) 858-860. 
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promptly satisfied, also having most of the available reserve troops at its 
disposal. At the same time, it was the best-equipped unit60, in no way inferior to 
an active combat division61. The most striking example from this latter 
perspective is the engineering works executed within the 1st Division sector, 
which turned the border area into a virtual battleground. Starting in 1948, a 
barrier of permanent fortifications arranged in a very extensive system was 
built, including trenches, barbed wire fences and mine fields. For example, in 
1951 alone, 318 km of barbed wire and 60.080 square meters of land mines were 
laid, with estimates from 1952 mentioning a possible total of 930.000 mines62. 
These organizational changes that doubled the personnel and endowed 
the CTG with combat tools proper were accompanied by and facilitated a more 
profound change within the border guard's range of activities. The increased 
number of soldiers in particular helped with the introduction of the Soviet 
model of border service, an evolution that also increased the density of border 
guards. The Soviet model meant a change of border watch layout toward a more 
centralized structure, as well as more extensive surveillance. Before this change, 
the basic unit for border watch was the so-called picket unit, which was a 
subdivision of a platoon. Three or more platoons formed a company, and the 
companies were subordinated directly to a full-fledged unit, the battalion, which 
had all the services the regime needed for control, especially political officers. 
With the new organization, the basic unit was the platoon, and later the border 
company. This was a structure that shortened the chain of command, meaning 
that the new basic unit was directly subordinated to the border battalions. It also 
enabled the regime to increase the density of soldiers on the border to almost 20 
per km, meaning one border guard every 50 meters. Moreover, the border 
service expanded its daily routine in space and time. 
From a maximum depth of 1 km into Romanian territory before, 
the border sector63 grew to almost 4 km, on multiple watch lines, with 
four patrols in a 24 hour interval64. These were measures taken in 
particular for the Yugoslav border, which also had its border strip65 
                                                 
60
 See Sever Neagoe, Personalităţi din evoluţia grănicerilor…cit., pp. 155-156. 
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 See ACNSAS, Fond Documentar, D 13.117/3, ff. 34-36. The documents are from a report 
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 ANIC, DGPMI, R 1326, cc. 870-871. 
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 The border sector was the territory of the country where the border guard had jurisdiction 
and patrolled. See Lexicon militar, Editura Militară, Bucureşti, 1980, p. 607. 
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allowed. See Lexicon militar,  cit., p. 10.   
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widened to 100 m, while the other Romanian borders had a border strip 
of only 50 m66. 
But, beyond the radical changes within the organizational frame of the 
CTG, even more intrusive for the activity of the border guards was the general 
political pressure on the border service, facilitated by the new structural scheme. 
By July 1948, Romanian border guards had been instructed to take a hostile 
attitude toward their Yugoslav counterparts and to act as zealous enemies of 
Tito in every aspect of their activity, even when not on duty with the border 
service, with the “party's eyes” watching their behaviour closely. The direct 
consequence of this was a permanent tension in the border service, with 
numerous incidents occurring on an almost daily basis. For example, in 1951 
alone, only the Romanian border authorities recorded 223 cases of hostile action 
from the Yugoslav side, 6 of which were air space violations, 33 violations of 
the border, 15 cases of violation of territorial waters, 54 shootings over the 
border line, 94 cases of challenges and insults being yelled, and 21 cases of 
throwing handouts over to the Romanian side67.  
Under these circumstances, it is no wonder that incidents like that of 
October 1951, when out of 38 soldiers asked if they wanted to stand watch at 
the border, only 3 said yes68, occurred frequently. As stated in documents, the 
spread of insubordination within the border guards was a consequence of the 
fact that they had heard about the relative liberalization in Yugoslavia, 
combined with the growing internal pressure. As a result, people became more 
daring and hostile toward the Romanian communist regime. In 1952, a note 
from the political directorate of the CTG about the Yugoslav border sector 
stated that some soldiers had turned the picture of Interior Minister Teohari 
Georgescu69 into a shooting target. Also, at an observation point were 
discovered labels with “Long live Tito and the U.S.A.!” or “We won't bear the 
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 ANIC, DGPMI, R 1326, c. 887. 
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 Ibidem., c. 881.  
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 The context of the incident was larger, including also a refusal by 8 soldiers to sign a 
letter of congratulations to the party leader, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, on grounds of poor 
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 Teohari Georgescu (1908-1976) – Romanian Interior Minister from March 1945 until 
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California Press, Berkeley, 2001. 
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communist yoke anymore!”70. Thus, it was no surprise that the desertions to 
Yugoslavia among Romanian border guards increased significantly, to the point 
that, for example, out of five officers of a platoon who were also junior party 
members, three fled over the border71. Statistically speaking, in 1948, out of 27 
defections nationwide, 18 were to Yugoslavia, and in 1949, out of 51, 43 were 
over the same border, with only 5 soldiers getting caught72. 
Finally, but maybe most importantly, there were the repressive results of 
the pressure brought upon the Romanian communist authorities by the conflict 
between Tito and Stalin. From this perspective, related to border control 
management but not only, the most vulnerable persons were the ethnic Serbs, 
who suddenly became suspects by their nationality alone. This is shown by a 
table dated 1949 from the above mentioned Department for the Control of 
Foreigners and Passports of the General Police Directorate of the Police, which 
identifies the Serbs who were state employees in Romania, even if they were 
simple teachers or beer factory workers [sic]73.  
However, the worst to suffer were those ethnic Serbs in particular who 
were identified as a potential danger for the security of the border with 
Yugoslavia74. They formed a great part of this ethnic minority, since they lived 
in the Banat region, mostly near the border or a few kilometres away from it. As 
a result, they became subject to several forcible mass removals75, motivated by 
the suspicion of the authorities toward them, and made possible by the 
discretionary legal regime of the border area. The largest scale such deportation 
was carried out in June 1951, when 43.899 people, most of them Serbs, on the 
basis of some nominal tables, were taken and relocated about 400 km away, in 
the Bărăgan plain, with the direct participation of border guard troops76. 
All these were possible under a prerequisite of the communist model of 
border management, namely Law No. 53 “for the institution of some safety 
measures in the border area”77, adopted as early as December 1947 by the 
regime. This document toughened the regime of the border area and expanded 
its legal framework, enabling the authorities to justify all sorts of discretionary 
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measures and actions. As we saw above, such actions went from mass 
deportations to small-scale domestic incidents around the border area, like 
the accidental shooting of peasants who, while working their lands, walked 
onto the border strip by mistake (at the time, along the land border with 
Yugoslavia, up to 1000 m within Romanian territory were removed from the 
farming circuit). Also, along the Danube, a natural border, no one could come 
closer than 25 meters to the river without special permission from the 
border guard78. 
A significant increase in acts of repression at the frontier, such as killings 
or people being put in detention, was the result of this bolstering of border 
defences, but not only79. This was a consequence of the sudden change of 
direction that illegal attempts to cross the border gained after the start of the 
conflict with Yugoslavia. If until the summer of 1948 the main flow was toward 
Hungary, after the international developments related to this conflict most of 
this flow changed its course toward Yugoslavia. The explanation is simple, and 
concerns the lack of any dialogue between the Romanian and Yugoslav 
authorities, meaning that any successful attempt to cross into Yugoslavia 
was very probably equivalent to a definitive escape to the “free world”80. It 
seems that the desire of the Romanians to escape the ‘communist heaven’ 
was more powerful than their fear of being shot at the border or imprisoned 
for 3 to 10 years81, at least in the first years after the split with Tito. 
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Considering that many of the relevant archives are still classified82, it 
is hard, if not impossible to have a complete overview of what happened at 
the Romanian border with Yugoslavia from 1948 until the middle of the 
1950s. Nevertheless, the documents we had access to, mostly coming from the 
control bodies of the RCP and from the former secret police, the Securitate, 
show the evolution that we indicated above. For example, if in 1948 at the 
Yugoslav border there were only 98 attempts of border crossing involving 191 
people, 60/115 being caught (at the Hungarian border there were 287 attempts 
involving 601 people, 173/361 being caught), in 1949 there were 199 attempts 
involving 314 people, 148/220 being caught (at the Hungarian border there were 
123 attempts involving 328 people, 85/238 being caught). In terms of the people 
shot, if in 1948 there were 13 cases at the Yugoslav border (59 at the Hungarian 
one), a year later the number of shootings increased significantly, reaching 58 
(at the border with Hungary there were 3)83.  
All these figures were registered before the fundamental reorganization of 
the border guard took place in the autumn of 1949 and in 1950. In the few CTG 
statistics that we found, in the last three months of 1951 only 29 people tried to 
cross the border with Yugoslavia illegally outside the usual border control 
points, of which 21 were caught. A year later, in 1952, out of 21 people who 
tried the same methods of escaping the country, 16 were unsuccessful84. Helped 
by all the structural changes detailed above and by these “results” in repressing 
border crossing attempts, the Romanian communist regime was very close to its 
political goal of completely closing the border with Yugoslavia in the last years 
before Stalin's death. From 1 January 1953 until 25th of April 1954, in the sector 
covered by the 4th Regiment, 1st Division, which dealt with a third of the 
Yugoslav border, only 48 attempts were made to illegally cross the border, 
involving 61 people85. 
 
 
Conclusion – No Stalin, No Conflict 
 
Starting with 1953, right after Stalin’s death, many of those sentenced on 
“Titoistic” charges were scheduled to be released through amnesty, which 
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happened gradually in the following years. In 1956, the minefields from the 
border with Yugoslavia were removed as relations with Tito’s regime rapidly 
improved. Even though the general conditions for those who wished to leave the 
country crossing the Yugoslav border remained harsh, including obstacles 
against crossing the border illegally, at least the additional pressure of a closed 
border with the “imperialistic enemy” was over86. All of these facts prove that 
the Soviet-Yugoslav conflict had an immediate and significant impact in 
Romania. However, this involved not only a general change of policy and 
attitude toward the south westerly neighbour, there were also consequences to 
this change of attitude. This affected state institutions greatly, beyond the 
ideological attitude toward Yugoslavia, especially the Border Guard Command, 
and, more dramatically, it affected people's lives in a very profound way.
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   Of interest here is a case of accidentally walking onto the border strip, which was no 
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presented in the official magazine of the Ministry of Justice in 1955. See Legalitatea 
populară, no. 8, 1955, pp. 864-868.  
